Current Circuit Splits

The following pages contain brief summaries of circuit splits
identified by federal court of appeals opinions announced between
September 4, 2014 and February 18, 2015. This collection, written by the
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, is organized into civil and
criminal matters, and then by subject matter and court.
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split, and is
intended to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a
comprehensive analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be
exhaustive, but aims to serve the reader well as a referential starting point.
Preferred citation for the summaries below: Circuit Splits, 11 SETON
HALL CIR. REV. [n] (2015).
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CIVIL
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Certification – Class Actions: Shelton v. Bledsoe, 2015 U.S. App.
LEXIS 253 (3d Cir. Jan. 7, 2015)
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether, for the purposes of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), the identities of members of a class must be
ascertainable. Id. at *8. The court noted that the 1st and 10th Circuits
rejected any “ascertainability” requirement for the purpose of Rule
23(b)(2) classes. Id. at *14. The court recognized that the 2nd Circuit
certified classes that were likely unascertainable without addressing the
issue. Id. The court further noted that the Fifth Circuit tied the issue of
“ascertainability” to the type of relief sought, striking a middle ground. Id.
at *16. The court agreed with the 5th Circuit, and reasoned that Rule
23(b(2) class actions are indivisible, and organized specifically for certain
types of relief, specifically injunctions or declaratory judgments. Id. at
*11. Thus, the 3rd Circuit concluded that it was not necessary for a class
seeking declaratory or injunctive relief to be ascertainable. Id. at *17–18.
Removal Procedure – Class Action: Romulus v. CVS Pharm. Inc., 770
F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2014)
The 1st Circuit addressed the proper interpretation of removal time
periods under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b)(3). The court found, based on the text of the statute, that when
removability is not clear from the initial pleading, section 1446(b)(3)
requires that the defendant look to the plaintiffs’ subsequent papers to
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determine whether the “removal clocks” have been triggered. Id. at 74.
The court acknowledged that several circuits have adopted a bright-line
test, but each differed in their application. Id. Both the 7th and 2nd
Circuits limited the inquiry to the contents of the plaintiff’s complaint or
later paper. Id. at 74–75. The court noted that, where the 7th Circuit
found that a plaintiff must specifically disclose the amount of monetary
damages sought in order to trigger § 1446(b)’s deadlines, the 2nd Circuit
allowed a plaintiff to trigger the removal deadlines by either explicitly
stating an amount or setting forth facts from which an amount in
controversy in excess of $5,000,000 can be ascertained. Id. In adopting
the 2nd Circuit’s approach the court found that the thirty-day time under
28 U.S.C.S. § 1446(b)(3) was triggered only when the plaintiffs’
complaint or plaintiffs’ subsequent paper provides the defendant a clear
statement of the damages sought or with sufficient facts from which
damages can be readily calculated. Id. at 69–70.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction – Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
§ 27: Manning v. Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc., 772 F.3d
158 (3d Cir. 2014)
The 3rd Circuit addressed “whether the exclusive jurisdiction
provision in § 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . provide[s] a
more expansive basis for federal-question jurisdiction.” Id. at 165–66.
The court noted that the 2nd Circuit found that where the court has
determined that a plaintiff’s state law claim does not arise under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 federal-question jurisdiction, federal jurisdiction cannot
alternatively be created under § 27, because § 27 “plainly refers to claims
created by the Act or by rules promulgated thereunder, but not to claims
created by state law.” Id. at 166. Conversely, the 9th Circuit held that for
claims raised under § 27, it is immaterial whether those claims arose under
§ 1331 because § 27 creates a more expansive basis for federal-question
jurisdiction. Id. The 3rd Circuit joined the 2nd Circuit and concluded that
the exclusive jurisdiction provision in § 27 does not provide for an
independent basis of jurisdiction. Id. at 167–68.
CIVIL RIGHTS
Standing – The Rehabilitation Act of 1973: McCullum v. Orlando
Reg’l Healthcare Sys., 768 F.3d 1135 (11th Cir. 2014)
The 11th Circuit addressed whether the scope of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973 (“RA”) grants standing to non-disabled persons. Id. at 1142.
The 11th Circuit recognized that the 2nd Circuit has broadly interpreted

2015]

Circuit Splits

385

standing under the RA. Id. at 1144. The 2nd Circuit held that “nondisabled plaintiffs were aggrieved within the meaning of 29 U.S.C.S.
§ 794a(a)(2) so long as they could show ‘an independent injury casually
related to the denial of federally required services to the disabled persons
with whom [they] are associated” and that prior 2nd Circuit precedent
interpreted associational standing “as broadly as possible under the
Constitution, irrespective of § 794(a).” Id. The 11th Circuit disagreed
with the 2nd Circuit and found that a party is “aggrieved” within the
meaning of § 794a(a)(2) only if she is personally excluded, denied
benefits, or discriminated against because of her association with a
disabled person” and the associational standing provision should not be
interpreted “irrespective of [the language of § 794(a)].” Id. Thus, the 11th
Circuit concluded that non-disabled plaintiffs lack standing to sue under
the RA. Id. at 1145.
Statutory Interpretation – Civil Rights Act of 1991: Brown v.
Sessoms, 774 F.3d 1016 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit addressed
whether Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701(1989)
determined that the express action at law provided by 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983
advances the exclusive federal damages remedy for the violation of the
rights guaranteed by 42 U.S.C.S. § 1981 when the claim is pressed against
a state actor. Id. at 1021. The court noted that 9th Circuit determined that
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overruled Jett. Id. Yet, the court agreed with
the 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 10th, and 11th Circuits in finding that
that Jett remains good law, and consequently, that § 1983 remains the
exclusive remedy for violations of § 1981 committed by state actors. Id.
The court reasoned that if Congress had intended to nullify Jeff, the Civil
Rights Act and its legislative history would have named it alongside
several Supreme Court decisions included in the Civil Rights Act, which
the Civil Rights Act is intended to overrule. Id. Nonetheless, Jett was not
identified even though it was decided less than two years before Congress
acted, and thus, the court concluded that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did
not overrule Jett. Id. at 1022.
EMPLOYMENT LAW
Employment Retirement Income Security Act – Finality of Remand
Orders: Mead v. Reliastar Life Ins. Co., 768 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2014)
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether plan administrator remand orders
under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) are
considered final decisions subject to appeal. Id. at 107. The court noted
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that the majority of circuits, including the 1st, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 11th
Circuits, have held that “because an ERISA remand order contemplates
further proceedings before the plan administrator, it is not ‘final’ and
therefore may not be immediately appealed.” Id. However, the 3rd, 9th,
and 10th Circuits held that these remand orders are final. Id. The 7th
Circuit, standing alone, has analyzed the “finality of ERISA remand orders
by reference to the statute governing remands to the Social Security
Administration,” found at 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Id. After analyzing prior
case law and the various approaches taken by its sister circuits, the 2nd
Circuit joined the 1st, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 11th Circuits and held that plan
administrator remand orders are generally not final and therefore should
not be subject to appeal. Id. at 109.
EMPLOYMENT LAW
Fair Labor Standards Act–Pleadings: Landers v. Quality Communs.,
Inc., 771 F.3d 638 (9th Cir. 2014)
The 9th Circuit addressed the “degree of specificity required to state
a claim for failure to pay minimum wages or overtime wages under the
[Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)]” in light of Twombly and Iqbal. Id. at
640. The court noted that the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Circuits determined that
“in order to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff asserting a claim to
overtime payments must specifically allege that she worked more than
forty hours in a given workweek without being compensated for the
overtime hours worked during that workweek.” Id. at 644-45. Conversely,
the 11th Circuit found that in order to state a plausible claim for relief, the
plaintiff need only state that the employer in question violated the FLSA
by failing to pay minimum hourly wages and failing to pay overtime in
hours worked over 40 hours.” Id. at 645. The 9th Circuit joined the 1st,
2nd, and 3rd Circuits and held that “detailed factual allegations regarding
the number of overtime hours worked are not required to state a plausible
claim . . . [but] conclusory allegations that merely recite the statutory
language are [not] adequate.” Id. at 644.
IMMIGRATION LAW
Immigration and Nationality Act – Waiver of Inadmissibility: Husic
v. Holder, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 264 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 2015)
The 2nd Circuit addressed whether an alien who lawfully entered the
country without lawful permanent resident (′′LPR′′) status but later
adjusted to LPR status is eligible to seek a waiver of inadmissibility under

2015]

Circuit Splits

387

the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 212(h). Id. at *2. The court
rejected the 8th Circuit’s interpretation that an alien is “lawfully admitted
for permanent residence” when he obtains LPR status following an
approval of application for adjustment. Id. at *8–9. The court reasoned
that because the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), expressly defined “admitted” to mean “[t]he lawful
entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization
by an immigration officer,′′ that adjustment of status was not contemplated
and therefore not relevant to “lawful entry.” Id. at *12–13. The court
joined seven sister Circuits to find that when an alien is admitted into the
United States as a visitor, but later attains LPR status by adjustment, then
the alien is not “an alien who has previously been admitted to the United
States as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” Id. at *1.
The court concluded that such an alien is eligible to seek a waiver under
INA § 212(h) if the Attorney General chooses to exercise favorable
discretion. Id. at *1,*6, *15–17.
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION
Investment Company Act of 1940 – Factors for determining whether
a statute grants a private right of action: Laborers’ Local 265 Pension
Fund v. iShares Trust, 769 F.3d 399 (6th Cir. 2014)
The 6th Circuit addressed “whether § 36(a) of the [Investment
Company Act of 1940 (“ICA”)] provides an implied private right of
action.” Id. at 406. The court noted that, while a circuit split does exist
as to this issue, all of the circuit courts that have decided this issue in the
wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S.
275 (2001), have held that “an implied private right of action does not
exist.” Id. In interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision, the 6th Circuit
determined that the threshold question is “whether the text or the structure
of the ICA indicates an intent by Congress to create an implied private
right of action under § 36(a).” Id. at 407. In analyzing the plain language
of the Act, specifically the first sentence of § 36(a) which states “[t]he
commission is authorized to bring an action . . . ” and the fact that § 36(b)
expressly creates a private right of action, court concluded that “neither
the text nor the structure of the ICA demonstrates an intent by Congress to
provide an implied private right of action under § 36(a).” Id. at 408.
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CRIMINAL
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
First Amendment – Freedom of Speech: United States v. Heineman,
767 F.3d 970 (10th Cir. 2014)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), as construed
in Virginia v. Black et al., 538 U.S. 343 (2003), “requires the government
to prove in any true-threat prosecution that the defendant intended the
recipient to feel threatened.” Id. at 975. The 10th Circuit recognized that
the 7th and 9th Circuits have embraced a “natural reading” of Black’s
definition of true threats. Id. at 979. Consequently, like the 7th and 9th
Circuits, the 10th Circuit interpreted Black as establishing that a defendant
can be “constitutionally convicted of making a true threat only if the
defendant intended the recipient of the threat to feel threatened.” Id. at
978. The 10th Circuit disagreed with the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 11th
Circuits, which all declined to read Black as “imposing a subjective-intent
requirement.” Id. The 10th Circuit read Black as imposing a subjectiveintent requirement. Id. Thus, the 10th Circuit concluded that lower courts
must determine whether the defendant “intended to instill fear before it
could convict him of violating § 875(c).” Id. at 981–82.
First Amendment: Freedom of Speech: iMatter Utah v. Njord, 2014
U.S. App. LEXIS 24164 (10th Cir. Dec. 22, 2014)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether “the government must exempt
indigent applications from otherwise-constitutional permit requirements
that they cannot afford.” Id. at 1264. The court recognized that the 3rd
and 11th Circuits have held “that permits for First Amendment Activity
cannot be conditioned on the applicant’s ability to pay.” Id. However, the
court also noted that the 1st and 6th Circuits held “that no indigency waiver
is required, at least where there remain ample alternative forums for the
speech.” Id. The 10th Circuit agreed with the 1st and 6th Circuits, and
held that “the Constitution does not mandate an indigency exception to an
otherwise-valid permit requirement” so long as ample alternative forums
for speech exist. Id.
Sixth Amendment – Tribal court convictions: United States v. Bryant,
769 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2014)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether, in a prosecution under 18
U.S.C.S. § 117(a), the government may use prior tribal court convictions
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that were obtained in the absence of counsel. Id. at 673. The court noted
that the 8th and 10th Circuits held that “a prior uncounseled tribal court
conviction could be used as a predicate offense for a § 117(a) prosecution”
because the Sixth Amendment does not apply in tribal court and thus using
a tribal court conviction in a subsequent prosecution cannot violate
the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 678. The court further noted that 9th
Circuit’s previous ruling in United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir.
1989) contradicted the views of the 8th and 10th Circuits. Id. The 9th
Circuit reaffirmed its holding in Ant that the government may not rely on
tribal court convictions as predicate offenses in § 117(a) prosecutions
unless the tribal court afforded the same right to counsel as guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment in federal and state prosecutions. Id. at 679. Thus,
the 9th Circuit followed its prior precedent, which prohibits the use of
tribal court convictions in §117(a) prosecutions. Id.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Acts and Mental States – Mens Rea in Making Threats: United States
v. Heineman, 767 F.3d 970 (10th Cir. 2014)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether “the First Amendment, as
construed in [Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003)], require[s] the
government to prove in any true-threat prosecution that the defendant
intended the recipient to feel threatened.”
Id. at 975. The court
considered varying interpretations of language used in Black, noting that
the 9th and 7th Circuits determined that there is a subjective intent
requirement, while the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th, 8th, and 11th Circuits declined to
apply a subjective intent analysis. Id. at 979. The 10th Circuit agreed
with the 9th Circuit, reasoning that subjective intent must be required, as
it “was the [Supreme] Court’s view that a threat was unprotected by the
First Amendment only if the speaker intended to instill fear in the
recipient.” Id. at 980. The court reasoned that, if subjective intent was
not required, the Black majority would not have used subjective intent as
a basis for invalidating the statute at issue. Id. In doing so, the court
rejected the opposing circuits’ argument that the language in Black
contained any ambiguity about what a speaker must intend. Id. Rather,
the 10th Circuit ultimately concluded that, “a defendant can be
constitutionally convicted of making a true threat only if the defendant
intended the recipient of the threat to feel threatened.” Id. at 978.
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Habeas Corpus – Statutory Time Bar: Ezell v. United States, 2015
U.S. App. LEXIS 1067 (9th Cir. Jan. 23, 2015)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether the gatekeeping procedures in 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D) are mandatory or hortatory when considering
second or successive 28 U.SC. § 2255 habeas corpus petitions. Id. at *5.
The court noted that the 1st, 4th, 6th, 7th and 10th Circuits have held the
time limit is hortatory, while the 11th Circuit considers this provision
mandatory. Id. The 9th Circuit agreed with the 1st, 4th, 6th, 7th and 10th
Circuits and held that when a when a § 2255 motion presents a complex
issue, the court may exceed the thirty-day time limit of § 2244(b)(3)(D).
Id. The court noted that the 6th Circuit found that “a statutory time period
providing a directive to an agency or public official is not ordinarily
mandatory unless it both expressly requires [the] agency or public official
to act within a particular time period and specifies a consequence for
failure to comply with the provision.” Id. at *6 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The court reasoned that when a statutory period fails to specify
a consequence for noncompliance, a court is not deprived of the power to
grant the successive motion. Id. Thus, the 9th Circuit held that the thirtyday statutory time limit of § 2244 is hortatory, not mandatory, and can be
exceeded when a § 2255 petition presents a complex issue. Id.
Plea Agreement—Government Withdrawal of Plea Agreement:
United States v. Haynes, 579 F. App’x 473 (6th Cir. 2014).
The 6th Circuit addressed whether the government must grant an
evidentiary hearing when a Rule 35(b) motion is withdrawn. Id. at
479. The court noted that the 2nd Circuit had previously held that an
evidentiary hearing is appropriate in these circumstances, because of the
possibility of a bad faith review. Id. at 842. Further, the court noted that
the 3rd Circuit held that the standard of review is limited to
“unconstitutional motives.” Id. The 6th Circuit agreed with the 3rd
Circuit and concluded that when a plea agreement affords the government
“complete discretion” to file a motion for a downward departure, their
standard of review is limited to the “unconstitutional motives”
standard. Id.
REMEDIES
Penalties –Mandatory Victims Restitution Act: United States v.
Kieffer, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24173 (10th Cir. December 22, 2014)
The 10th Circuit addressed whether restitution under the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act is a criminal penalty, subject to the requirement
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that a jury must first consider the evidence before a criminal fine is
imposed. Id. at *23 – 25. While the 1st and 8th Circuits both found that
restitution is a criminal penalty, the 9th Circuit held that it is a criminal
penalty only under certain circumstances. Id. at *25 – 26. Conversely, the
10th Circuit reasoned that “the purpose of restitution is to restore victims,
not punish offenders; therefore restitution may be ordered by a district
court without an evidentiary finding made by a jury. Id. at *25–26. Thus,
the 10th Circuit concluded that “restitution is a civil remedy designed to
compensate victims – not a criminal penalty.” Id. at *25.

